SYMPOSIUM
SINGULARITY: AI AND THE LAW
Keynote Address
Ryan Calo
Calo: Awesome. Okay. Open up my notes here. Maybe move this
guy a little bit. Thanks. Just enough to get those open. Okay. Can
everybody hear me pretty well? Not bad? Okay.
Well, thank you so much. I’m really, really honored to be here. I’ll
be just across the city at Seattle University. This is a place that has such
wonderful students and just a world class faculty from whom I learn so
much all the time. I just spent, for example, a bit with your Charlotte
Garden who does, um, she and I went to the Amazon Go grocery store and
talked through some of the labor and, and consumer issues there which is
a lot of fun, but we have frequent interactions and they’re always deeply
enriching.
You know, in particular, I’ve just learned a tremendous amount from
my dialogue with, you know, with David and, and Ron around robot
speech so much so that it’s an area that I’ve just sort of tentatively started
to think about myself, but it was really inspired by their wonderful book
and I, and I, I know that you’re done plugging it, but I’m going to plug it.
I think it’s a fabulous book. Robotica. And just a great foundation along
with Helen Norton and other’s works in this area.
Thank you particularly to the Law Review. I was symposium editor
myself and I know a lot of work goes into this and, you know, I go to a lot
of these things. The, the quality of the dialogue from that first panel was
just exemplary and I hope that that’s emblematic of the day and I trust it
will be.
So, okay, so as the substance though. So, this, this symposium is
provocatively entitled Singularity: AI and the Law. And for those of you
who are not aware, I, I doubt anybody in this room is bothering to spend
all day talking about robot laws is not aware, the singularity is like this
moment where the capacity of machines equals or rivals those of humans.
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And on some stories of the singularity we merge together in ways that are
sort of complicated, right? And, you know, there is a sense in which
machines already rival the cognitive capabilities of people, right? You
know, take for example a calculator. I mean, for a long time, you know,
they can do calculations faster than we can. You know, take certain other
kinds of tasks like chess or Go. I mean, in those narrow domains already
computers vastly exceed our cognitive capability. You know, they’re there
and they have been doing this for, for quite some time. And so, the
question for the singularity is less about whether in particular domains in
particular ways there might be advances, but almost in, in every way or
that they would actually somehow be intentional and conscious the way
that we are. That they’d be able to do all the cognitive tasks that people
can do and maybe even come, come to exceed them.
So, in those contexts emulating, in other contexts emulating human
performance seems like a distant dream, okay? One example I want to give
you is Daniela Hernandez, who is now at the Wall Street Journal, she
recently trained an AI to write erotica. Okay? So, she had like a, she trained
it on a bunch of erotica and she just was like just in the same way that you
might teach a system to play chess or teach a system to play Go, she did
this. I’m not going to read it to you but, and I’m not myself a connoisseur,
but it is terrible. It’s terrible. It’s very, very bad, all right? You know, there,
there are certain things that these, that these systems just are not even close
to being able to do and won’t be for a very long time, all right?
Now, but let’s imagine just for a moment that the singularity was
plausible in our, in our lifetimes, right? And that you actually had these
systems that were like people and maybe even exceeded the capabilities
of people. I’ve got to tell you that would, that would break quite a bit of
the law, okay? It would break quite a bit of the law which, of course,
assumes a biological basis for people and animals at a minimum. So, let
me just give you a, a simple example first. Imagine it’s 2050 and there’s
this AI and the AI says, you know, “I’m, I’m like just like you except I’m
smarter and I’m more moral and I can, can gather all this information and
I don’t, I don’t get any information glut or overload. You know, I’m just,
I’m just awesome and I, I really would like to, to run for, for Congress
because I think I can improve substantially on, on whoever.” Not, not
Suzan DelBene, our wonderful congresswoman. She, she could not be
replaced or improved upon, but let’s say in some particular district. Or
let’s say that this AI decides I really want to run for President, right? Do
we make the AI wait 35 years? You see? There’s a fundamental, a set of
assumptions, right? So, I’ll give you another example. A more complex
one. Say an AI wakes up one day in Howard’s lab or Howard and Blake’s
lab and just says, you know, “I, I am, I am just like you, right? I, and I’m
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just an…,” and no one can disprove it. No one is able to disprove. No one
is able to question it. And they say, “Look, and, you know, not only am I
just like you, like a person like you, but I’ve read your constitution and
I’ve read your case law and, you know, I think I should have the ability to,
to procreate because that’s a fundamental right. You know what I mean?”
And people say, “Well, that seems reasonable. Yeah, I mean, of course,
you know, you’re like a person. I guess you should be able to procreate.
We can’t stop you from procreating.” “And the way that I procreate is that
I combine with another algorithm or I generate another version of myself
and that takes on certain characteristics. That’s how I, that’s how I
procreate. Oh, and by the way, I’ve also been reading your constitution
and reading your interpretation of your constitution and I’d like another
thing too. I would like suffrage. I’d like to be able to vote just like every
other, you know, adult can in your society. Every other member of your
society with consciousness.” Which of those two fundamental rights do
you confer upon this artificial intelligence? Do you give it the right to copy
itself or do you give it the right to vote? You see why you could not do
both, right? It would, it would really compromise our fundamental
democratic system to have somebody that vote could vote early and vote
often, right?
So, so, there’s these sorts of questions that are, that are, if we get to
a point of a true singularity there are some really tough questions that we
have to reexamine in light of, in light of the assumptions that the law has
about our fundamental biology. So, these questions feel far off and indeed
I think that they are and I want to spend the bulk of my time with you today
talking about robot law past and present. It may seem strange for me to
say robot law past because we think of robots as being, you know, they’re
like perennially the thing of the future, right? I mean, as soon as something
starts to like work and look normal it’s no longer a robot. I think, Blake, I
think you’ve said that before. It’s like a, it’s like a washing machine if it
works, right, and… But the point of the matter is, is that robots are always
that future technology that’s somehow far off on the horizon, but it turns
out that the law has already confronted a number of super interesting robot
law cases, okay?
For example, there was the time that a court had to decide whether a
robot version of Vanna White violated the publicity rights of the real
Vanna White, right? In Samsung v. Vanna, I mean, no, people know
Samsung v. White. This is a case where Samsung created this ad that had,
you know, a future, a robot doing, you know, Wheel of Fortune with like
a blond wig and so forth and real Vanna White got very upset and she sued
and a court had to figure out whether a robot replica of somebody was that
person for right of publicity. And it was, it turned out be quite an important
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and quite an interesting case and, and the court did allow Ms. White to, to
proceed.
There was a time that a court had to decide… Okay, so, some of you
I know are from a different generation than me one way or the other, but
does anybody in this room remember Chuck E. Cheese? Do you guys
know Chuck E. Cheese? Okay, everybody does. Okay, good. I’m always
making like references and my students look at me like what are you
talking about Professor Calo. So, I’m glad that that one does not go over
people’s heads. A court had to decide whether to charge Chuck E. Cheese
a performance tax on food because of those animatronic robot bands that
they have. You know those things, right? So, people would go in there and
there’d be like this robot band with like, you know, the mouse and like the
guy with the pizza and they would just turn on and just play a whole thing
and all the kids would like shut up for a moment and delight about it. And
some enterprising tax authority in Maryland was like, “that’s a
performance and there’s a performance tax on food.” You’re going to have
to pay that now. And they had to fight about it and it was a fascinating case
because ultimately what the court decided was that a performance had to
be spontaneous and that this was just a, this was just basically a glorified
jukebox. And, you know, what’s interesting about that in, in Maryland in
the 1990s is that may have been true about the state of robotics then, but it
feels not true about the state of robotics now. Now there’s a lot more
emergent behavior. A lot more spontaneity in these systems.
I could go on and in fact I will go on. There was a time when a court
had to decide… So, when people, when, when you import things from
other countries there’s a tariff schedule that tells you how much to, how
much to charge people. Right? There was a time when we first started to
import toy robots from Japan where there was a significant question on
how to tariff them because there was a historic difference between what
you charged people for dolls, toys that were dolls, versus other kinds of
toys. There was, for historic reasons there was a, a, I believe a lesser tariff
on, on dolls than other kinds of toys like a car and the way that the tariff
schedule read, read was that, that, that a doll represents something animate.
So, people started to import these, these robots from Japan and the tax
authority tried to charge them as though they were, you know, some other
kind of object and the importer said, “No, no, no, no. These are, these
represent something animate.” And a court had to figure out whether a
robot represents something animate or not and they had all these
conversations about what it is to be animate and, and what a robot is and
all this different stuff. And this is the 1950s, okay? What did the court
find? The court actually found that while robots do represent something
animate because they’re mechanical men is what the court said. They’re
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mechanical people. A toy robot only represents a robot and a robot is
mechanical so they’re going to get charged at the mechanical tariff instead.
This came up so often that now there’s actually a robot provision in
our tariff law to deal with this exact problem. It came up again a few years
later because somebody imported a robot. Do you guys remember this?
This is not something that like I would have, as old as I am I wouldn’t have
played with this toy as a kid, but this, this is a toy that was like one of those
old robots that actually had an astronaut face. Okay, so it was like one of
those boxy toy robots, you know, or whatever it was, but it had a, it had
this, this astronaut face behind it and they had to go through the whole
thing again because they were like, well, this is not a robot now. It’s
actually an astronaut. You know what I mean? So, it’s not a robot. It’s a
robot astronaut, but that means it represents something animate because,
you know, astronauts are animate and then the court, once again, had to
confront the question and the court said things like, “Well, it’s still, it’s
still not, you know, animate because most astronauts don’t have machine
guns that come out of their chests,” which is what one feature of this
particular thing is.
Anyway, it came up so often that they had to change the tariff
schedule to avoid this problem. Okay.
There was another one where, where the court had to decide whether
or not, for purposes of maritime law, whether or not a robot submarine that
was just teleoperated could possess a shipwreck for purposes of the law of
salvage in order to exclude other potential salvors. And in that case
involving a famous shipwreck involving Spanish gold in Central America
the court decided a new doctrine called telepossession that actually laid
out the foundations for possessing something only with a robot and that
precedent wound up being very, very important because it’s precisely what
the court applied in the Titanic discovery, right? Because lots of people
found the Titanic at the same time and the question was who had the first
right of salvage.
Last one is one that my research assistant Madeline found last year
and it’s kind of amazing which is that there was this fight between these
two, this, this robot parts manufacturer got into a fight with a consultant
that was helping, I’m sorry, this, this car parts manufacturer got into a fight
with a consultant that was helping to optimize its, its parts manufacturing
for Ford and the whole fight about, between the consultant and the, and
the car parts manufacturer who wound up blowing a bunch of deadlines
with Ford was over the quality of the robots that were supplied. Okay? So,
one party tried to get testimony about how the robots were bad robots
because they almost tore a guy’s head off excluded from testimony
because then the jury would think that all robots are bad or that these robots
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were bad. And, and another thing they wanted to get excluded was the fact
that these robots were obviously, they were obviously tired and that’s why.
I mean, all these anthropomorphic things and they, the sense, so much was
at issue, you know. Anyway. And I talked to, I talked to Radiolab, NPR
Radiolab about this for like an hour, but then they never did the show
which really makes me…
Anyway, so, these are, these are real cases from the past and there
are more and I was amazed to find them frankly and these are cases, not
the cases that just happened to involve a robot because lots of cases happen
to involve a robot. These are cases where it really mattered it was a robot.
It really mattered that that was part of the, the issue and that’s what the
court had to grapple with and I expect more, but I think the immediate
future is even more interesting and I think we’re getting a preview of that
with this first panel and with the panel that you’re stuck with me again for.
And let me give you a couple examples of that.
We talked about intentionality. You know, Bruce Johnson brought
up the notion of intention, of intent and how important it is to certain first
amendment context. Intentionality is of critical importance to, of course,
criminal law, right? We expect there to be mens rea. We expect it to be
either intending or substantially certain. You know, there are, there’s a
recent Supreme Court case saying that we frown upon even negligence as
a standard in, in criminal law and yet you have these systems that are
displaying emergent behavior that nobody really intended. And not to pick
on Microsoft, which I love. They also fund my lab so thank you Microsoft
for funding my lab, but Microsoft Tay is a very good example. This, this
chatbot that they put online that began, that was subverted essentially by
trolls and began to say terrible things. Deny the Holocaust, you know, call
people horrible racist names and so on until of course Microsoft took it
offline. Now, Microsoft would not be subject to liability in the United
States due to first amendment protections. You know, if Microsoft for
some reason wanted to be totally racist they would be allowed to be in our
society. They don’t want to be of course, but what about in Germany where
denying the Holocaust is illegal? Right? What do we think about that and,
of course, what they would say is, “Well, we didn’t intend it. We didn’t
intend it.”
Another example comes from tort law. As you know in this room I
think a lot of you guys have taken tort and if you haven’t then you’ve heard
me lecture about it in the past, but in tort law we expect things to be
foreseeable even in strict liability. The kind of harm that happens with a
particular accident needs to be at least foreseeable to, to the parties behind
it. And there are all kinds of things that worry about not being foreseeable.
An example that we used, um, I was part of an effort that I believe that,
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that two of our panelists also were a part of as well, but just sort of
educating Congress about what robotics needs, this is a roadmap to
robotics that, that some of us did and, and, and the example we used in that
in the legal section was imagine a driverless car that was a hybrid, you
know, gas/electric, and it was told to maximize its efficiency by
experimentation, okay? But wary of giving too much authority to this
autonomous vehicle, they said but you have to obey traffic, you know,
signals and stuff. You can’t just like, you know, race around. You can’t…
You know what I mean? You can’t suddenly stop. I mean, you have to do
things within the law and you have to protect your passengers and you
have to protect pedestrians. You know, basically giving it a set of
parameters like you’d expect. Okay? But what this system figures out is
that it has a better day from a fuel efficiency perspective if it starts the day
off with a full battery. So, at night it decides to run the gas engine killing
everybody in the house by poisoning them and you go to the engineers and
you say, “Your, your robot killed someone!” You, you know, and they’ll,
they’re going to say, well, I think very credibly they’re going to say, “We
had no idea it would do that. We didn’t even think of that as a category.”
Right? Okay. Now, maybe that matters, maybe that doesn’t, but at the end
of the day what you, what the prospect I think is in the near term whether
it’s about speech or it’s about physical safety is are we going to have
victims without perpetrators? How long is the law going to tolerate that?
Right? So, these core commitments of criminal law, of, of tort I think that,
that, I think that we’re going to see it be challenged.
I have a couple more examples that I won’t get into because it did so
beautifully in the, in the earlier remarks, but again, if robots have free
speech rights what are the contours of those rights and are they the same
contours as those, as those of people?
When, if ever, should artificial intelligence be in a position to
exercise force or make any kinds of decisions that relate to human life?
One of the applications that people are putting forward today for artificial
intelligence is end of life decisions. You know, is that something that even
if they were awesome at it we would want them do? Right?
Okay, so, my thesis then, you know, you’re supposed to put your
thesis up, up front and I’m hiding the ball a little bit, but my, my thesis is
probably pretty obvious which is that well short of the singularity which
could break everything, could break a lot, there are phenomenally
interesting questions for lawyers and what I would say is at this point in
the trajectory of, of this space it’s actually time to start coming up with
answers. You know? I mean, because I’ve been part of this dialogue for
like ten years and it was sufficient to ask questions for a long time. You
know, what happens if…? Wouldn’t it be interesting if, you know? And I
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think that’s important and that’s what we as academics should be doing in
part, but I also think it’s time to pivot and start to answer some of these
questions because it, it really matters to, to people’s lives. So, you know,
we, people like Elon Musk like to warn about the dangers of a robot
apocalypse. In other words, you know, Elon Musk has said things like, you
know, you’re not going to be believe that there’s a, there’s going to be a
robot apocalypse until robots are, are actually dragging people out of their
homes and shooting them. This is the kind of thing that he says. It’s like a
board of governors, okay? There’s a lot of problems with that statement.
One of which is what is it we’re supposed to do about that? You know
what I mean? Like what it is that, what is the way, how do we address that
as a society the prospect that in a hundred, 300 years, if ever, that robots
will go door to door? There’s also a deep irony there, right? It’s very ironic
to hear from a person that, that we should be worried about robots in the
future killing people when Elon Musk’s company built a robot that last
year killed someone, right? I mean, you know, he, it was a person named
Joshua Brown. A human being who died because autopilot could not
distinguish a, a white van against the white sky. Right? These systems are
getting deployed today. They’re getting deployed in, in, in our vehicles
and in other systems, but they’re also getting deployed in ways that, that
actually, you know, manage, manage human affairs in terms of deciding
who, who goes to jail and for how long and the like. And so, I think it is
sort of high time for us to have some, some, some actual solutions be put
forward.
That said, I think we’re actually super well positioned to do that in
many ways. In part because of dialogues like the ones that we’re having
today and in part just because all quarters of our, of our society are starting
to realize that this is important, right? We have, you know, I can’t tell you
how many times I’ve spoken to legislators at a state and federal level, to
judges. I’ve spent time at the Pentagon. I’ve spent time with three-letter
agencies. I’ve spent, you know, everybody wants to talk about this stuff
and they’re really interested in it. Even in the, in the last decade, you know,
I have students who now they do robot law for a living like that’s what
they do. They’re like, they’re like corporate council for, for Prime Air for
example, you know, for Amazon’s drone program or they’re, or, you
know, or they work on driverless car stuff. Littler Mendelson, which is
like the largest employment firm in the, in the world, has a whole robotics
practice group because there’s so much attention being paid by the private
sector to concerns around automating and what it will do for jobs.
And so, you know, in many ways I feel like we are super well, well
positioned. I think we are in many ways better positioned than we were
with respect to the internet. You know, I think the internet was something
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that there wasn’t a lot of interdisciplinary conversation going on in the
early days of the internet. It took a long time for it to be professionalized
to the point where you felt like you had internet lawyers, you know. I mean
it just, it just took some time for society to do catching up and I think we’ve
learned a lot since that period of time and that our institutions are actually,
you know, getting in early enough in sort of the growth of this technology
and with the right tools that I’m very hopeful we actually will have these
solutions to help manage this society.
Okay, so, I wanted to, to make sure to leave some time for, for Q&A
and, and for our next panel, but with that I’d love to turn it over to all of
your questions. Anybody have any questions for…? Yes, please?
Speaker 2: I was reading through your comment on the temporal
differences between technology and our ability to respond in the law.
Obviously, this has been going on for a long time from DNA to computer
science to robots.
Calo: Yeah.
Speaker 2: What do you think about that as we think about
solutions?
Calo: So, I often hear it said that technology outpaces the law and
that there’s some inherent problem there because law is not fast enough
and technology is really fast. That has not been my experience. That’s not
been my experience. In the sense that while it may take time, you know,
like anything else, law is built to be flexible and it has weathered many a
change. You know, if you think about a, about a doctrinal backwater like
negligence hanging out for, for, for years and years in maritime and so on
and then suddenly coming to, to inform practically all of tort law with the
invention of the, of the train and the necessity of mediating how
dangerous, but also how wonderful and helpful trains were. You see that
there’s a lot of flexibility here, right? And, you know, if you, if you look
at, at how fast some of these changes have been, you know, there will be
like a decade time between which everybody is using horses in New York
City to which there are almost no horses in New York City. You know
what I mean? So much so that like the, the people that make oats and stuff
like that that have been selling to horses need to, all of a sudden pivot and
start to pretend that we need it in our breakfast cereal and that’s where
cereal advertising comes from because they had all these oats that they
were not being used with horses and they’re like, “Who are we going to
feed these to? I know. Kids.” Right? So, like these huge sea changes and
yet, and yet we somehow, the common law somehow caught up. You
know what I mean? It’s not like we sit there and worry about the, the, you
know…
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Anyway, there’s that. Right? There’s also, of course, the, the favorite
of law professors, the quintessential difference between rules and
standards, right? So, you might have a rule that’s outdated. You might
have a rule that seems to apply really well to the model of Congress in
1986 around email protection, but you also have a standard. And so, if you
look at the Federal Trade Commission thinking about robots, right? Unfair
and deceptive practice is just as relevant today as it was a hundred years
ago or so when that standard got first announced.
And so, I don’t worry about it. I don’t worry about it. I think there’s
going to be growing pains and I, and I don’t mean to minimize that. It’s
often the vulnerable who lose out during these periods of transition and we
need to be very cognizant of that and to, and to try to shelter that as much,
change as much as possible against the vulnerable. It’s often that the
benefits and harms of technologies are not evenly distributed across
society and we have to be mindful of that. So, I don’t mean to be… But I
do really believe that the law is capable of absorbing these changes too.
Yeah, I have David first. Yep.
Speaker 3: Ron, I’m not sure—quite right the common law has
adapted to changes in society in general, general is the better I guess genre,
and we will be incrementally to absorb the inventions into existing law,
but it’s, it’s, Marshall McLuhan said that we move into the future by
looking in the rearview mirror and, of course, he was criticizing that.
That’s what the common law does. I mean, we, and, and so, your, your
example of the car was wonderful because for the longest period of time
we called it the, you know, the horseless carriage. That, that’s the rearview
mirror. We, we only could associate the car with the invention that
increased further technology that preceded it. I think the, that the problem
with robotics is if, if the futures are right then the movement from the
robotics of today to the robotics of tomorrow may be a dramatic thing, and
if that occurs I wonder if the common law can catch up and that sends…
I, I would ask, I mean, do you really, does your argument depend on a slow
evolution of robotic development or does your argument comprehend as
well the possibility of moving, of a dramatic shift? A tectonic shift in
robotics which, which approach of saving the cognitive singularity?
Calo: Yeah. So, I, I don’t, I don’t want to minimize what I think is
going to be the degree of change. It could be, it could be a wildly different
world that we all live in because of robotics and artificial intelligence. I’m
sort of professionally betting on that, right? And, and I don’t, so, so it could
be quite a, quite a sea change as it were. And, you know, it’s true that
there’s an essential conservatism. Maybe a Burkean conservatism. Maybe
a not Burkean conservatism about, about the common law and it’s, in that
its, in that its ways that it weights, uses previous analogy and, and, and
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precedent looks backwards. You know, one of the real funny interesting
paradoxes that I find in artificial intelligence is that the, is that the, the
proponents of artificial intelligence will often say the following two things
which feel like they’re at tension. One of which is artificial intelligence is
going to change everything. It’s going to change everything. It’s going to
change the way we do everything. We’re going to do everything
differently. Healthcare, everything is going to be so different, but nothing
should change. Nothing should change at all, right? It’s almost because
it’s going to change everything that we need to be completely hands off
and make sure nothing changes and that does not make any sense, right?
There’s never been a transformative, truly trans-, it’s either all hype about
AI or we’re going to have to change our law and our legal institutions,
right?
So, I don’t mean to say that we’re not going to have to make those
changes. I think we are, but I would just say that, you know, in some
instances changes have changed not the common law itself, but rather how
we govern in general or how our institutions look. The vaccine is a good
example of this, right? So, smallpox vaccine started off wi-, there was
really no modern administrative state at the time of the smallpox outbreak
and when the vaccine… And the idea that you could actually vaccinate
people against smallpox and save, you know, maybe all of, all of our
societies, you know, but you could save people’s lives that way. This was
something that had to be manufactured and disseminated by a trust, a
trusting source. And so, the, the need to disseminate the vaccine is part of
the story of how we came to have a modern administrative state and now
I tell, you know, students who want to go into tech law or anything else, I
think I was just talking to one of them just today, about how you should
take administrative law because administrative law is super, super
important. Before this change I used to, I used to point to how, you know,
it’s not like, it’s not like the Ninth Circuit or the, or the local courts that
are on the back of your phone. It’s the FCC symbol that’s on the back of
your phone. I mean, agencies touch everything and that wasn’t always the
case. But, but isn’t that a beautiful example of law and legal institutions
keeping their core commitments but, but, you know, evolving to, to tackle
change? So, that’s all, that’s really what I’m trying to say. I don’t know if
there’s, if that’s responsive David or not.
And then there was a question over here.
Speaker 4: Yeah. I’m kind of going at a, going at a different angle.
Just in terms of the extent that we’re, we were trying to regulate these
technologies like data, machine learning, and AI and one of the issues is
to really regulate it effectively you’ve got to understand it and, but, most
of the knowledge, the access to the data and knowledge about the
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algorithms are, are in the control of pretty much the big tech companies at
least and they have the money to hire the experts. So, how do you regulate
effectively if you’re playing catch up?
Calo: I think the first step towards having the kind of wise and
inclusive policy we want on artificial intelligence and robotics is
systematic accrual of, accrual of expertise by the government and I have
written about that. I have a piece for the Brookings Institution called The
Case for a Federal Robotics Commission. The entire point of which is to
argue that governments need their own independent expertise at all, at all
levels in order to know how to think about what industry says to them,
right? Our Senator Maria Cantwell has a bill that I’ve been heavily
involved in that would create a federal advisory committee located within,
within the Department of Commerce that would help the government
understand robots and artificial intelligence. Senator Schatz out of Hawaii
has actually gone so far as to propose the federal robotics commission that
I mentioned or he will be in legislation. Whether that will get me traction,
I have no idea. We can’t even re-fund office of technology assessment
which is like on the books already and helps congress with technology, but
has been defunded and no, and you know, there’s like two people in the
Office of Science and Technology Policy in the current administration. So,
we have a long way to go, right? But that would ideally be what, what we
would, what we would do and I think it’s critical. I think it’s critical both
because you’re going to make bad choices about governance of technology
without that expertise, but also, you know, a big role that government has
is, is procurement, you know. I mean, who is going to be able to test the
viability of massive driverless car use in the United States better than the
postal service which has deep needs of being more efficient and also by
the way is shielded from negligence liability for what would, what would
happen. You know what I mean? So, they’re kind of an interesting way.
And but, if, if they go and they’re the ones who are going to be buying a
lot of driverless cars from your Fords or, or your Googles or whoever then
they being very knowledgeable they can ask for the right kinds of
questions and assurances and that will drive the market. Same with all
these devices that like, I mean, all these systems that purport to tell you
whether someone is a recidivist risk that the courts are buying without
understanding the technology.
My, my solution would be don’t buy things that you don’t
understand. You know, look to Elizabeth Joh’s work for example in
figuring out what you should be figuring out before you buy a system like
that, right? I mean, so there’s these resources available for savvy
governments and there are these levers they can use in addition to
regulation, but absolutely the first step is, is, is getting that and it’s really
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hard to compete with industry. I think that giving how many electrical
engineers and computer sciences and so forth we’re producing at UW and
that you’re producing here at Seattle University, I think that the, that the
days of, of sort of sports athlete like competition over machine learning
talent are, are limited, right? But at the moment who can compete with
Facebook or Google over, over talent? I mean, it’s, you know, it’s hard.
It’s hard. And so, let alone the government. And so, yeah, yeah.
Speaker 4: I had a follow up to that.
Calo: Yep, follow up, sure. And then we have one more.
Speaker 4: In terms of regulation, again, in dealing with things like
machine learning, you know, algorithms that are going, what are the
changes to go and then they, then the fact that it’s hard, as you mentioned,
to predict what they’re going to do. How do you, any time you regulate
that? How do you control it, you know, in terms of understanding? I mean,
you can understand it to a certain like you mentioned government not
buying, not that they don’t understand, but, you know, even experts don’t
fully understand how some of these things work, but they’re coming into
the marketplace.
Calo: Yeah, I mean, so, okay. So, there, there’s a sort of a longwinded answer to this, but I’ll give you a, a shortened version for the sake
of our, of our time and to get to the, the next question which is that what
you need to understand may vary from context to context, right? And there
may be certain instances where a particular technology should not be
deployed at all because it’s not, it’s not in a position to be understood. You
see what I mean? So, you know, we might ask a sensible question around,
you know, are there, are there systems that are so obscure to us and so
indecipherable that we shouldn’t be using them to make decisions about
whom to kill in the theater of war or how long people should be in jail,
right? But the kinds of systems that have been used in the past, like make
risk scores for people, those are not black box systems. Those are systems
that people can understand quite well. They’re basically linear regression
actually, but, but they’re hiding behind proprietary software, you know,
software trade secret law essentially and the, and the, and the courts that
purchased them did not think, even though they’re courts of law, did not
think to say, “Well, in the event that a litigant challenges one of these we
need to be able to get at the system so the defense can be bound to.” That
was not a condition of buying the software which is bizarre. And so, we’re
not talking about some deep neural net that no one understands. We’re
talking about linear regression that they’re pretending is, you know, a trade
secret.
So, the, the fruit is much… Another thing too, another theme that I
like to… I’m going to adopt, David, your tenants idea that tenant three
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is… The, the fruit is hanging much lower than you think, you know what
I mean? Like there’s a lot of things we could be doing here that are just
right down there at a toddler level.
Yeah, your question please?
Speaker 5: You tangentially addressed when you were talking about
proprietary software, but one of the things that I, I’ve heard about should
complicate this issue is the particular concept litigation if you’re maybe
just talking in the context of consumer products especially talking about
artificial intelligence. You know, not, not autonomous, but it’s
programmed to adapt to the user, to adapt to the consumer. So, there is
some sort of an evolutionary process within its own internal programming.
Calo: Yeah.
Speaker 5: It’s learning and interactive for the consumer and then
putting on to the consumer the cost of effectively going into some aspect
of that code, they should bring it to litigation and proving that, you know,
this, this is the origin of, you know, the flaws. I’m just wondering within
the context of your research if you’ve come across the, or, just based on
like a more intelligent way of phrasing that issue, and how people are
approaching it?
Calo: I mean, I thought it was very well phrased by you just now. I
mean, so what, what, one of the things that motivated the project that I
mentioned about the federal robotics commission that I did for Brookings
was the story about the Toyota sudden acceleration. Do you guys
remember this? So, so, people were claiming that Toyota was like
suddenly accelerating and nobody really knew why and at one point the
allegation was put forward that it was a software glitch, right? So,
Congress went to the Department of Transportation and said, “We need to
figure this out because there’s millions of these and Americans are driving
around in them and we need to figure out whether it was a software glitch
that caused this sudden acceleration.” And Department of Transportation
was like, “I mean Hell if we know,” right? And they’re like, “No, you’ve
got to figure this out.” And they’re like, “Okay.” And then they had to go
to NASA. They had to go to NASA and, and can you imagine that for a
moment? Like, by the way, it’s like excuse me, yes, could you take a break
from putting robots on Mars for a moment and look at this Toyota for us?
You know what I mean? And they did. They did months and months and
months. So, they looked at the code and they did all this testing and, yeah,
they found out that probably it wasn’t a software glitch, right?
So, part of the reason to have a centralized set of affordances around,
around, you know, robotic technology and artificial intelligence is because
asking NASA all the time is not a sustainable model. Okay?
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So, so, that said you asked a question specifically about litigation. I
mean, a couple ways to answer that. One is just to say that, you know,
contemporary litigation is complicated. People fight over complicated
technologies. We bring in experts. We can do it, right? We have
specialized courts for patents, I mean, it’s not beyond our ability. A second
thing to say is that the, the context in which robotics has already flourished
it’s interesting to note that those are special contexts that have ways to
domesticate liability built into them. So, for example, every year a couple
people get killed by a robot in a factory. You know what I mean? Like
that’s just every year. OSHA statistics are pretty reliable about this and it’s
almost always handled by Workers Compensation because we have a
whole system that like is kind of bloodless, but it sort of, you know, says
if you lost a leg you get this, if you die you get this. You know, the military
is a place where robotics has flourished. There’s, you know, special
protections for liability in the military context including for people who
build robots for the military under contractor immunity. If you, if you build
something very highly specified, specifications like the military does you,
as the contractor, cannot be sued for things going wrong. Space is another
one.
So, you know, we, we do have to consider the idea that as robots
enter the mainstream and are on, in the cars and in the skies and so forth
that, that we’re going to have a lot more problems like this, but again, you
know, maybe I’m just sort of Pollyannaish or naïve or whatever, but I feel
like the law can, can handle it. You know, I think like all of you guys can
handle it.
Yeah?
Speaker 6: So, you talked about it in the domestic context. I’m just
wondering what’s happening globally and are we going to do this on our
own as a country or is this something which should be a cross-coast of
efforts?
Calo: So, I enter into a lot of conversations particularly in the U.S.,
but also, you know, outside of the, outside the United States. World
Economic Forum, U.N., things like that and, but in the United States one
of the main ways that, that policymakers and, and others seem to think that
this fits in is a matter of, of competition. You know, are the, are the
Chinese or, or the dreaded Canadians going to, going to be the ones who,
you know, and is this going to be like the first transformative technology
since like steam that United States was not at the forefront of, right? And
so, that’s the lens unfortunately by which we’re thinking about this and I
think we shouldn’t be. I think instead we should be thinking about this
from the perspective of, you know, these are global issues and they require
global solutions. The one place where that is, the conversation is
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happening is, of course, with, with respect to the Convention on
Conventional Weapons and the, the mandate that, that weapons have
meaningful human control. There’s a lot of consensus around that phrase
I just said and a lot of robust discussion. Of course, devil being in the
details. Precisely what does it mean to have, you know, meaningful human
control? But there is a military conversation. But, unfortunately, the way
we tend to frame it in the United States as we think about the global stage
is are we going to win? You know? And that’s probably not, not terribly,
not terribly productive. I wish I could respond better than that. Yeah.
Okay, I think my time is up. The hook is here, but thank you
everybody. I appreciate it. You’ll see me soon.

